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Countries differ on the extent to which their financial system relies on banks or on the financial 
market. We offer a model featuring a possible two way relationship between countries’ financial 
system architecture and their comparative advantage. Countries specialising in bank dependent 
sectors favour the development of the banking sector. Simultaneously, countries with more 
efficient capital markets develop comparative advantage in sectors with strong dependence on 
market finance. To empirically investigate our model’s predictions, we construct a measure of 
sector bank dependence and establish a strong relationship between countries’ comparative 
advantage and their financial system architecture. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent research in international trade has unveiled a strong relationship between international 
trade patterns and financial development. In particular, it has been established that for 
countries with deeper financial development their exports are dominated by goods produced 
by financially dependent sectors.
1
 Moreover, the causality of this relationship seems to bi-
directional. While Beck (2003) and Manova (2013) provide evidence suggesting that 
countries’ financial development may act as a source of comparative advantage and therefore 
shape trade patterns, Do and Levchenko (2007) offer support for the reverse link, namely, 
ﬁnancial development is itself inﬂuenced by comparative advantage. According to the first 
explanation comparative advantage is driven by technology: countries that have a 
technological comparative advantage in sectors that depend on external finance have a 
stronger incentive to develop their financial system. In contrast, the second explanation 
suggests that comparative advantage is driven by institutional quality: countries with better 
quality financial institutions have deeper financial development and thus support the 
promotion of financially dependent sectors. 
The treatment of financial markets in the above literature is basic. It fails to recognize 
not only the variety of financial sources potentially available to firms but also the cross-
country variation in their relative development. These variations are well documented by 
Allen and Gale (2001) who highlight the differences between on the one hand the USA and 
Britain with their well-developed capital markets and on the other hand Japan, Germany and 
France where traditionally banks have provided the main financial support for firms. These 
differences might have something to do with the industrial advantages enjoyed by these 
countries. For example, in the USA with its emphasis on the development of new 
technologies a well-functioning capital market encourages the dispersion of new information 
while in Germany and Japan the predominance of manufacturing suggests that intermediary 
finance is more suitable for dealing with standardized information.
2
  
In this paper we take a close look at the link between financial system architecture 
and the patterns of international trade. If the Allen and Gale (2001) conjecture is true then we 
should be able to identify a relationship between a country’s predominant source of domestic 
funds and its patterns of exports. Therefore, our first step is to check if the hypothesized link 
                                                          
1
 There are many related theoretical contributions (for examples, see Antras and Caballero, 2009; Beck, 2002; 
Chaney, 2013; Ju and Wei, 2011; Kletzer and Bardhan, 1987; Matsuyama, 2005; Wynne, 2005). None of these 
papers make a distinction between financial sources which is the main focus of our work. 
2
 See also Allen and Gale (1999).  
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is borne out in the data for OECD members, that is, countries at sufficiently high stages of 
financial and economic development. To do so, we propose a novel sectoral indicator of 
external finance dependence that captures the relative dependence of each sector between 
bank and market finance. Our methodology is similar to the one used by Rajan and Zingales 
(1998). However, instead of measuring the external finance dependence of each sector, our 
variable captures the sectoral relative dependence on each of the two source of finance, i.e. 
bank finance and market finance. Using this new indicator, we document a strong and 
significant relationship between cross-country differences in financial system architecture 
and export patterns. The exporting sectors of countries where bank finance is the dominating 
external finance source are those that relatively depend more heavily on bank finance. In 
contrast, for countries where market finance is stronger their exporting sectors are those 
sectors for which bond and equity finance is relatively more important.
3
  Clearly, finding 
support for the conjecture does not also provide an explanation for the relationship between 
financial market architecture and the patterns of international trade. 
With this in mind we develop and analyse a theoretical model of an open two-sector 
Holmström and Tirole (1997) economy where both bank and market finance co-exist.
4
 
Entrepreneurs in both sectors need external finance and can obtain it either from the capital 
market or from intermediaries who provide, in addition to external funds, monitoring services. 
The ability of entrepreneurs to obtain external finance and the source of funds depend on the 
level of their endowments of the unique input in production. Credit rationing arises in the 
model in order to mitigate moral hazard. Only those entrepreneurs with sufficiently high 
endowments can obtain funds from the capital market. Some of those entrepreneurs unable to 
access the capital market might be able to obtain finance from banks albeit at a higher cost.  
Our method of analysis follows Antras and Caballero (2009). One difference between 
their set up and ours is that they are only concerned about financial constraints and not the 
source of finance and thus in their case it is sufficient to work with homogeneous agents 
                                                          
3
 The qualification ‘relatively’ in the last two sentences is important. On average, bank dependence would be 
much higher in countries where bank finance is more prominent relative to direct finance. When comparing 
sectors, what matters is the ratio of bank to direct finance and not the values.  
4
 There is a well-established literature offering a variety of explanations for the co-existence of bank debt and 
direct finance in closed economies (for example, see Allen and Gale, 1999; Besanko and Kanatas, 1993; 
Bhattacharya and Chiesa, 1995; Bolton and Freixas, 2000; Boot and Thakor, 1997; Boyd and Smith, 1998; 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994; Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995; Diamond, 1991; Repullo and Suarez, 1997; 
Von Thadden, 1995). For our work we opted for the Holmström and Tirole (1997) framework because it has 
been straightforward to work with its two-country extension. 
3 
 
while we need to introduce heterogeneity to allow for differences in the ability to access each 
type of finance. 
 We begin by differentiating the two sectors so that one sector is relatively more bank-
dependent. The idea here is that the sectors that are relatively more bank-dependent are the 
same in all countries. Thus, the optimal financial source depends on the nature of the 
technology. Starting from a position where two countries are identical so that their relative 
price is the same and, hence, international trade is absent, we introduce a technological 
advantage in one of the two sectors in one of the two countries. We show not only that this 
country will have a comparative advantage in that sector but also that it will develop 
relatively more than the other country the financial market on which that sector is relatively 
more dependent. Next, starting once more from the symmetric position we weaken the 
efficiency of the banking system in one of the two countries. Now, we find not only that the 
country with the lower quality banking system ends up with a relatively less developed 
banking sector but also that it has a comparative disadvantage in the bank-dependent sector. 
In both cases we find an association between financial architecture and the patterns of 
international trade but in one case the driver is technology while in the other case it is the 
relative quality of financial institutions. Therefore, our model identifies two distinct 
mechanisms that are consistent with an association between financial market architecture and 
export patterns. 
Our final step is to return to the empirics and assess if there is any support in the data 
for either/both of the mechanisms identified by our theoretical work. We begin by looking for 
any effects of financial market development on trade patterns. As in Manova (2008), we use 
the dates of equity market liberalization for each country in our sample to identify exogenous 
shifts in financial development. While Manova (2008) shows that the liberalization of equity 
markets have a stronger effect on the exports of sectors that are more dependent on external 
finance, we complement her finding by identifying a stronger effect for sectors that depend 
relatively more on equity markets. Thus, our results offer support for the second mechanisms 
identified by our theoretical work. 
We then look at the impact of countries’ trade patterns on the development of their 
banking sector relative to their financial market. By following the instrumental variable 
strategy of Do and Levchenko (2007), we construct an instrument using the estimated eﬀect 
of geography variables on trade volumes across sectors. Do and Levchenko (2007) evaluate 
how a country’s external finance requirement given its export pattern affects its external 
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financial development. Instead, we show that a country’s bank finance requirement affects 
the development of its banking sector relative to its financial market, providing support for 
our first theoretical mechanism. Taking all together, our empirical findings show the complex 
interactions between a country’s financial architecture and its sectoral export patterns, where 
both our theoretical mechanisms could be at play. 
Our work complements a number of studies that examine the link between financial 
market architecture and economic performance. For example, Black and Moersch (1998), 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001) and Levine (2002) focus on the potential influence of 
financial market architecture on economic growth. Similarly, Rajan and Zingales (1998) and 
La Porta et al. (2000) identify the quality of the legal system and its associate contracting 
environment as key determinants of economic performance. Lastly, Tadesse (2002) suggests 
that bank systems serve better economies in their early stages of development where the vast 
majority of firms are of very small size.  
 
2. Are Financial Systems and Trade Patters Linked? 
Our aim in this section is to find if there is any support in the data for the Allen and Gale 
(2001) hypothesized link between financial system architecture and the patterns of 
international trade. According to their work, efficient matching between the sources of 
external finance and the various sectors of the economy depends on the technological 
characteristics of each sector that, in turn, determine the types of frictions that the 
corresponding contracting environment will have to overcome. Therefore, our first task is to 
construct an index that ranks sectors according to their relative use of bank finance compared 
to market finance.  
2.1. Bank Finance Dependence Index   
The construction of our measure of sectoral bank dependence follows the methodology 
developed by Rajan and Zingales (1998). While their index ranks sectors according to their 
overall external finance requirements our index will rank sectors according to their reliance 
on bank loans relative to funds raised in debt and equity markets.  
We use firm’s balance sheet information from the Standard and Poor’s Compustat 
North America database. The database hosts over 24,000 publicly traded companies in the 
United States. The sample employed included all non-financial firms listed on the stock 
exchange during the period 1976-2004. Publicly listed companies provide arguably more 
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reliable and complete information concerning their income and balance sheet statement as 
they have to follow stringent reporting requirements laid down by the Security and Exchange 
Commission. 
For each firm and for each year we derive the ratio of outstanding bank loans to the 
total amount of outstanding external finance.
5
 Our measure strictly follows the methodology 
used by Rajan and Zingales (1998). We sum across the whole period each firm's average 
short term borrowing received from banks and then divide by the sum of each firm’s total 
external finance to obtain each firm’s bank finance dependence. As in Rajan and Zingales 
(1998), we turn the firm-level information into a unique sectoral indicator of Bank Finance 
Dependence (BFD) by taking the median firm’s value for each sector as the indicator of the 
sector’s bank finance dependence. We then convert the 4 digit SIC industry level Compustat 
data to the 3-digit ISIC revision 3 industry level.
6
  The bank dependence index is presented in 
Table 1 for the 28 3-digit ISIC sectors. 
 [Please insert Table 1 about here] 
 There is a strong implicit assumption behind the methodology used by Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) and in the present paper. The rankings of sectors across countries according 
to any of the measures of financial dependence are the same as those for US. Given that in 
this paper, we concentrate on OECD countries, this is probably not a major drawback. As 
long as the choice of finance in countries with well-functioning institutions is driven by 
technological considerations, as the corporate finance literature suggests (e.g. Allen and Gale, 
2001), and the choice of technology in each sector is similar across countries then we would 
expect similar rankings. This may not be the case in non-OECD countries where the market 
finance is poorly developed and firms rely predominantly on banks for their external financial 
needs. 
                                                          
5
 The exact definition provided by Compustat for the variable used for the numerator is as follows: “… this item 
represents the approximate average aggregate short-term financing outstanding during the company’s reporting 
year. Short-term borrowings are usually in the form of lines of credit with banks.” The external finance measure 
represents finance obtained from both banks and the capital market. It includes average short term borrowing, 
debt senior convertible, debt subordinated convertible, debt debentures, and preferred stock. Debt senior 
convertible is the part of long term debt that represents the balance sheet amount of outstanding senior 
convertible debt. Debt subordinated convertible is the part of long term debt that represents the balance sheet 
amount of outstanding subordinated and convertible debt. Debt debenture is also part of long term debt with the 
condition to pay back the principal and the interest as stated which is not convertible or subordinated. Preferred 
stock represents the balance sheet amount of stated value of redeemable and non-redeemable preferred shares 
issues. 
6
 We use the Haveman’s concordance table to convert from 4-digit SIC revision 3 industry level to 4-digit ISIC 
revision 3 industry level and the United Nations concordance table to aggregate from 4-digit ISIC to 3-digit 
ISIC revision 2 industry level . 
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2.2. Cross-Section Analysis: Methodology and Data 
In this section, we use the BFD index to estimate the relationships between cross-country 
differences in financial system architecture and the patterns of international trade among 
OECD countries. Our methodology follows Beck (2003) and Svaleryd and Vlachos (2005) 
and relies on the interaction between sectoral intensity in bank finance, captured by our new 
index, and countries’ predominant source of domestic funds. At the country level, variations 
in financial system architecture are captured by the development of the banking sector 
relative to the development of equity and bond markets. The supposition is that in countries 
where the banking sector is more prominent than market finance, the export leading sectors 
ought to be those sectors that rely relatively more on bank loans for funding their activities.  
We estimate the following model: 
𝑋𝑐𝑖  =  𝛼 0  +  𝛽1(𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑐  ×  𝐵𝐹𝐷𝑖) + 𝛽2(𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑐  ×  𝐸𝐹𝐷𝑖  ) + 𝛾𝑐 + 𝛾𝑖 +  𝜀𝑐𝑖 
Our dependent variable 𝑋𝑐𝑖 is a measure of the log of export for country 𝑐 in industry 𝑖.  It 
measures the export flows at the 3 digit SITC Revision 2 classification from the Trade and 
Production Database complied by Nicita and Olarreaga (2006). The trade data are collected 
from the United Nations trade statistic database (Comtrade). Using a concordance table, they 
converted the data from SITC Revision 2 to ISIC 3 digit level Revision 2. The unit of 
measurement used for the export flows is the value of shipment in US dollars representing the 
value of exports of the reporting country. This data is available for 28 sectors for the year 
2000.   
𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑐 is a measure of banking development for country 𝑐. The variable captures 
the relative size of the banking sector compared to the size of the whole financial system and 
is measured using the Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2009) dataset. For each country-
year, we provide a measure of the share of funding provided by the banking sector in the total 
amount of external finance provided by both markets and intermediaries. The size of the 
banking sector is measured as the total value of deposit money bank assets. We measure the 
variable in the denominator in two different ways that provide two alternative indicators. In 
BankDev1, we estimate the denominator by adding the value of the numerator and the value 
of stock market capitalization, while in BankDev2 we also add the private bond market 
capitalisation to the denominator. Table 2 presents the variables BankDev1 and BankDev2 
for United States, UK, France, Japan and Germany for the year 2000. 
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Table 2: Bank Development in 2000. 
 
COUNTRY BankDev1 BankDev2 
United States 0.255 0.178 
United Kingdom 0.399 0.377 
France 0.497 0.426 
Germany 0.688 0.543 
Japan 0.735 0.638 
 
𝐵𝐹𝐷𝑖 is the index derived above and measures the dependence of sector i on bank 
finance. Given that it does not vary with time we do not include 𝐵𝐹𝐷 on its own in the 
regression as it is captured by the industry fixed effect. As a control variable, we also include 
the interaction between a sector’s total external finance dependence (EFD), as measured by 
Rajan and Zingales (1998). 𝛾𝑐, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛾𝑖   are the country and industry specific effects, 
respectively. Given that both our sectoral variables (BFD and EFD) and the country specific 
variable BankDev do not vary with time we do not include them in the regression as they are 
captured respectively by the industry and the country fixed effects. 
2.2. Cross-Country Analysis: Results 
Table 3 presents the results obtained from our sample of 30 OECD countries for the 
year 2000. Columns I and III use our first indicator of banking development (BankDev 1) 
while columns II an IV rely on our second indicator (BankDev 2). An alternative way to 
check the robustness of the results obtained above is to ensure that the bank finance 
dependence indicator is not capturing the overall external finance dependence of a sector. 
Columns III and IV include the interaction between a country’s bank development and 
External Finance Dependence. The sign of this interaction term (BankDev*EFD) is negative 
but non-significant. More importantly for us, the introduction of the second interaction term 
only marginally affects our results. When considering a country with a similar level of bank 
development to that of Japan (BankDev1 = 0.735, see Table 2), the coefficient 𝛽1 estimated 
in column I implies that a sector relying solely on bank finance (BFD = 1), is associated with 
an increase of trade by 160 percent compared to a sector relying only on market finance 
(BFD = 0). This increase will only be of 56 percent in a country with a similar financial 
architecture to that of the US (BankDev1 = 0.255).  
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Table 3: Export Patterns, Financial Architecture and Bank Dependence 
Bank Development measure BankDev1 BankDev2 BankDev1 BankDev2 
 I II III IV 
Bank Development 2.189*** 2.043*** 2.067*** 1.780*** 
   * Bank Finance Dependence (BFD) (0.645) (0.619) (0.709) (0.676) 
     
Bank Development   -0.354 -0.766 
   * External Finance Dependence (EFD)   (0.565) (0.556) 
  
# Observations 839 839 839 839 
R-squared 0.835 0.834 0.835 0.835 
The dependent variable is the log of exports to the rest of the world by each 3-digit ISIC sector for the year 2000. 
The Bank Finance Dependence variable is defined in section 2.1. All regressions include a constant term, year 
and exporter-sector fixed effects. Robust standard-errors reported in parentheses. ***, **, *, indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
 We consistently estimate a strongly positive and highly significant coefficient for the 
interaction term (𝛽1 > 0) thus finding support for the Allen and Gale (2001) conjecture, that 
is, the exports of countries with a high level of banking sector development are dominated by 
sectors that are more reliant on bank finance. 
 We have conducted several robustness checks for which we omit the detailed results 
in the main text. Notably, the estimations presented in Table 3 have been produced for each 
year between 1994 and 2004. Furthermore, we have clustered the standard errors either at the 
country or at the industry level. The coefficient 𝛽1 remains positive and significant at least at 
the 10 percent level in all these specifications. These robustness checks are presented in 
Appendix 2. 
 
3. The Model 
We present a two-country model with heterogeneous agents that offers two, potentially 
complementary, interpretations of the patterns identified in the last section. 
Consider a two-sector (𝑗 = 1, 2) economy populated by a continuum of agents of 
mass 2. Agents differ according to (a) their endowments of capital, 𝐴, the only input in the 
production of the two goods, and (b) their sector-specific skills. Half the agents (unit mass) 
have skills specific to sector 1 and the other half have skills specific to sector 2. The 
distribution of endowments among the agents of each skill-type is uniform with support on 
the interval [0, 1]. All agents are risk-neutral and have identical homothetic preferences 
allocating half of their income on each good.  
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There are two production technologies. The first technology is a simple deterministic 
CRS technology that is available to all agents. One unit of physical assets invested in this 
technology yields one unit of good 1 and one unit of good 2.
7
 The second technology is 
stochastic and sector specific. Only agents with skills specific to sector 𝑗 can use the sector 𝑗 
technology. Production in each sector requires a fixed investment of 𝐼(> 1) units of capital. 
The technology either succeeds and yields 𝑌𝑗  units of consumption or fails in which case it 
yields nothing. Following the Holmström and Tirole (1997) model we assume that the 
probability of success depends on the behavior of the entrepreneur. When the entrepreneur 
exerts effort the probability of success is equal to 𝜃 while when she shirks the probability of 
success is equal to 0, however, in the latter case she derives an additional benefit 𝐵𝑗, that is 
sector dependent. We assume that the stochastic technology is more productive than the CRS 
technology only when entrepreneurs exert effort i.e. 𝜃𝑃𝑗𝑌𝑗 > 𝐼 ∑ 𝑃𝑗𝑗 , and below otherwise, 
i.e. 𝐵𝑗 < 𝐼 ∑ 𝑃𝑗𝑗 , where 𝑃
𝑗  denotes the price of the consumption good produced by sector 𝑗.  
In this economy agents have the following three choices. Firstly, they can invest their 
endowment in the CRS technology. Secondly, they can invest their endowments either in the 
capital market or in a bank. Thirdly, they can invest in the stochastic technology by 
borrowing additional assets from lenders. Those agents who invest in the stochastic 
technology need to obtain external finance to cover the difference between the level of 
investment and their endowments, 𝐼 − 𝐴. They can potentially raise funds by either issuing 
debt in the capital market or by obtaining loans from banks.
8
 Both the capital market and the 
banking system are competitive. Let 𝑅 denote the endogenous equilibrium interest rate in the 
capital market.  
All lenders can verify the outcome of each project but cannot observe the level of 
effort exerted by each entrepreneur which gives rise to a moral hazard problem.  We begin 
our analysis with the capital market. Under the assumption that borrowers are protected by 
limited liability, the financial contract specifies that the two parties receive nothing when the 
project fails.
9
 Let 𝑉𝑐
𝑗
 denote the payment to the lender when the project succeeds which 
implies that the entrepreneur (borrower) keeps 𝑃𝑗𝑌𝑗 − 𝑉𝑐
𝑗 ≡ 𝑉𝑏
𝑗𝑐
. Consider an entrepreneur 
with initial endowment 𝐴. The lender’s zero-profit condition, under the assumption that the 
                                                          
7
Given that our main results concern deviations from cases where the two sectors are symmetric it is important 
to keep the output levels the same. Unity is only imposed for simplicity. 
8
 Given that projects yields nothing in the case of failure there is no distinction between debt and equity.  
9
 Having the lender making a payment to the borrower would only weaken incentives and given that all agents 
are risk neutral there is no need for insurance. 
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borrower has an incentive to exert effort, is given by 𝜃𝑃𝑗𝑉𝑐
𝑗 = (𝐼 − 𝐴)𝑅. The last expression 
can be written as  𝜃(𝑃𝑗𝑌𝑗 − 𝑉𝑏
𝑗𝑐) = (𝐼 − 𝐴)𝑅. The left-hand side is equal to the expected 
return of the lender and the right-hand side is equal to the opportunity cost of the loan. The 
entrepreneur will exert effort if the incentive compatibility 𝜃𝑉𝑏
𝑗𝑐 ≥ 𝐵𝑗   is satisfied. The 
constraint, which can be written as 𝑉𝑏
𝑗𝑐 ≥
𝐵𝑗
𝜃
 sets a minimum on the entrepreneur’s return 
which is equal to the measure of agency costs  
𝐵𝑗
𝜃
. For a given contract the entrepreneur has a 
higher incentive to exert effort when the probability of success is higher. In contrast, a higher 
benefit offers stronger incentives for shirking. The constraint also implies that the maximum 
amount that the entrepreneur can pledge to the lender is equal to (𝑃𝑗𝑌𝑗 −
𝐵𝑗
𝜃
). It is exactly 
the inability of entrepreneurs to pledge a higher amount that limits their ability to raise more 
external funds. Substituting the incentive compatibility constraint in the lender’s zero profit 
condition we obtain a threshold level of endowments, 𝐴ℎ
𝑗
, such that only those agents with 
endowments higher that this threshold can obtain market finance. The threshold is given by: 
 𝐴ℎ
𝑗 = 𝐼 −
1
𝑅
[𝜃𝑃𝑗𝑌𝑗 − 𝐵𝑗]        (1) 
Those agents unable to obtain market finance might be able to obtain a loan from a bank. 
Banks act as monitors. By monitoring the activities of their clients banks can reduce the 
private benefit to 𝑏𝐵𝑗, where 𝑏 < 1. But monitoring is costly. We assume that it costs 𝑐 units 
of capital.
10
 Let 𝑉𝑚
𝑗
 denote the loan repayment when the project succeeds which implies that 
the entrepreneur keeps 𝑃𝑗𝑌𝑗 − 𝑉𝑚
𝑗 ≡ 𝑉𝑏
𝑗𝑚
. Consider an entrepreneur with initial endowment 
𝐴. The monitor’s zero-profit condition is given by 𝜃𝑃𝑗𝑉𝑚
𝑗 = (𝐼 + 𝑐 − 𝐴)𝑅; which can be 
written as  𝜃(𝑃𝑗𝑌𝑗 − 𝑉𝑏
𝑗𝑚) = (𝐼 + 𝑐 − 𝐴)𝑅 .11 Once more, the entrepreneur will exert effort 
if the incentive compatibility constraint  𝜃𝑉𝑏
𝑗𝑚 ≥ 𝑏𝐵𝑗 is satisfied, which can be written as 
𝑉𝑏
𝑗𝑚 ≥
𝑏𝐵𝑗
𝜃
. Substituting the new incentive compatibility condition in the monitor’s zero 
profit condition we can derive a new threshold, 𝐴𝑙
𝑗
, such that only those agents with 
endowments above that threshold level can obtain bank loans. The new threshold is given by: 
𝐴𝑙
𝑗 = 𝐼 + 𝑐 −
1
𝑅
[𝜃𝑃𝑗𝑌𝑗 − 𝑏𝐵𝑗]       (2) 
                                                          
10
 The exact specification of the monitoring technology is not important as long as we can rank sectors 
according to their dependence on each source of finance.  
11
 In equilibrium an agent will be indifferent between buying bonds and depositing her endowments in a bank.  
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Borrowing from banks is clearly more expensive than issuing bonds given that monitors must 
be compensated for their services. The coexistence of a capital market with a banking system 
requires that 𝐴ℎ
𝑗 >  𝐴𝑙
𝑗
. From (1) and (2) we find that this will be the case if the following 
inequality is satisfied: 
 𝑐 <
𝐵𝑗(1−𝑏)
𝑅
           (3) 
Finally, we assume that all agents have homothetic preferences allocating half of their 
income on each good. Then, in a symmetric equilibrium where 𝐵1 = 𝐵2 and 𝑌1 = 𝑌2 it is    
clear that 𝑃1 = 𝑃2 and the masses of agents obtaining finance from each source is the same 
across types.  
From now on we let good 2 be the numeraire, i.e. 𝑃2 = 1 and let 𝑃 denote the relative 
price of good 1. 
3.1. Closed-Economy Equilibrium without Banks 
For the moment, suppose that the monitoring technology is not available. Given that agents 
always have the option to invest their assets in the CRS technology, the equilibrium interest 
rate must satisfy 𝑅 ≥ 1 + 𝑃, where the expression on the right is equal to the return of the 
CRS technology. Then, the number of entrepreneurs investing in the stochastic technology is 
determined by either the number of eligible entrepreneurs (the ‘financing constraint’) or the 
total assets available for borrowing (the ‘wealth constraint’). We now define the two types of 
equilibrium that can occur in this model. 
Definition 1: Wealth Constrained Equilibrium (WCE): 𝑅 ≥ 1 + 𝑃 . All endowments are 
invested in the stochastic technology. 
The imperfections in the capital market do not affect the allocation efficiency of the economy 
as all capital is invested in the more productive stochastic technology.
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Definition 2: Financially Constrained Equilibrium (FCE): 𝑅 = 1 + 𝑃. Some endowments 
are invested in the CRS technology. 
Now, financial markets affect allocation efficiency as some assets are invested in the CRS 
technology. 
3.1.1. WCE 
                                                          
12
 However, imperfections in financial markets imply that entrepreneurship is decided by endowments while in 
the case of perfect capital markets this decision is indeterminate. Nevertheless, in both cases the mass of 
entrepreneurs is the same. 
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Financial market clearing requires that the following condition is satisfied: 
 ∫ 𝐴𝑑𝐴
𝐴ℎ
1
0
+ ∫ 𝐴𝑑𝐴
𝐴ℎ
2
0
= ∫ (𝐼 − 𝐴)𝑑𝐴
1
𝐴ℎ
1 + ∫ (𝐼 − 𝐴)𝑑𝐴
1
𝐴ℎ
2  
The left hand side is equal to the supply of capital by all lenders. The right-hand side is equal 
to the total demand for external finance. We can rewrite the above condition as: 
 1 = [2 − 𝐴ℎ
1 − 𝐴ℎ
2 ]𝐼            (4) 
Without any loss of generality, we restrict our attention to the market for good 1. Each 
producer supplies 𝑌1 units of good 1 with probability 𝜃. Each agent allocates half her income 
on good 1 hence her demand is equal to her nominal income divided by 2𝑃. The good 1 
market clearing condition is then given by: 
∫ (𝜃𝑌1 −
𝜃𝑃𝑌1−𝑅(𝐼−𝐴)
2𝑃
)
1
𝐴ℎ
1 𝑑𝐴 = ∫
𝑅𝐴
2𝑃
𝑑𝐴
𝐴ℎ
1
0
+ ∫
𝑅𝐴
2𝑃
𝑑𝐴
𝐴ℎ
2
0
+ ∫ (
𝜃𝑌2−𝑅(𝐼−𝐴)
2𝑃
)
1
𝐴ℎ
2 𝑑𝐴  
The term on the left hand side is equal to the net supply (production minus 
consumption) of good 1 producers. The first two terms on the right-hand side are 
equal to the demand for good 1 by those agents of each skill-type who become lenders 
and the last term is equal to the demand for good 1 by the producers of good 2. We 
can rewrite the above condition as:  𝑅(1 − [2 − 𝐴ℎ
1 − 𝐴ℎ
2 ]𝐼) = 𝜃𝑃𝑌1[1 − 𝐴ℎ
1 ] −
𝜃𝑌2[1 − 𝐴ℎ
2 ]  
which by using (4) can be simplified to: 
 𝑃𝑌1[1 − 𝐴ℎ
1 ] = 𝑌2[1 − 𝐴ℎ
2 ]         (5) 
The relative price is equal to the ratio of aggregate production in sector 2 divided by 
aggregate production in sector 1.  
 Conditions (2), (4) and (5) solve for the two threshold values, the interest rate and the 
relative price. As long as the solution for the interest rate is greater or equal to 1 + 𝑃 we have 
a WCE. Given that all assets are employed in the more productive technology there is no role 
for banks. 
3.1.2. FCE 
Suppose that the above derivation yields a solution for the interest rate that is less than 1 + 𝑃. 
This cannot be an equilibrium because the CRS technology offers a higher return that an 
investment in the capital market. In the new equilibrium some assets will be invested in the 
CRS technology up to the point where the interest rate is equal to 1 + 𝑃 and thus agents are 
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indifferent between the two investment choices. We obtain the two new threshold levels of 
endowments that separate those agents that can still invest in stochastic technology by setting 
𝑅 = 1 + 𝑃 in (1). The total investment in the CRS technology 𝑍 will be equal to the excess 
supply in the financial market when 𝑅 = 1 + 𝑃 and is given by 
𝑍 = 1 − [2 − 𝐴ℎ
1 − 𝐴ℎ
2 ]𝐼 for 𝑅 = 1 + 𝑃         (6) 
The market clearing condition for good 1 is now given by: 
∫ (𝜃𝑌1 −
𝜃𝑃𝑌1−(𝐼−𝐴)(1+𝑃)
2𝑃
)
1
𝐴ℎ
1 𝑑𝐴 + 𝑍 =
∫
𝐴(1+𝑃)
2𝑃
𝑑𝐴
𝐴ℎ
1
0
+ ∫
𝐴(1+𝑃)
2𝑃
𝑑𝐴
𝐴ℎ
2
0
+ ∫ (
𝜃𝑌2−(𝐼−𝐴)(1+𝑃)
2𝑃
)
1
𝐴ℎ
2 𝑑𝐴  
Now the supply of good 1 is augmented by the quantity produced using the CRS technology, 
where each unit of physical assets increases the supply of each good by 1 unit. Notice that, 
given that 𝑅 = 1 + 𝑃, the income of lenders and those who invest in the CRS technology is   
equal to 𝐴(1 + 𝑃). We can write the above expression as:      
(1 − 𝑃)𝑍 = 𝜃𝑃𝑌1[1 − 𝐴ℎ
1 ] − 𝜃𝑌2[1 − 𝐴ℎ
2 ]      (7) 
3.1.3. External Finance Dependence  
Following the literature we say that sector 2 is more external finance dependent than sector 1 
if the total borrowing of sector 2 is greater than the total borrowing of sector 1. In the absence 
of banking, the external finance dependence of sector 𝑗 is equal to its total borrowing from 
the capital market, 𝑀𝐹𝑗. Formally, 
 𝑀𝐹𝑗 = ∫ [𝐼 − 𝐴
1
𝐴ℎ
𝑗 ]𝑑𝐴 = [𝐼 −
1+𝐴ℎ
𝑗
2
] [1 − 𝐴ℎ
𝑗 ]          (8)    
At this point we introduce an asymmetry between the sectors that affects their access to 
external finance and will later impart a bias towards a particular source of finance. 
Proposition 1: Suppose that initially there is a symmetric equilibrium where  𝐵1 = 𝐵2 and 
𝑌1 = 𝑌2 and thus 𝑃 = 1 and consider a small increase in 𝐵1. Then, at the new equilibrium 
we have:  
(a) 𝑃 > 1, and 
(b) Sector 2 is the more external finance dependent sector.  
Proof: See Appendix 1. 
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The reduced access to external finance in sector 1 reduces output of good 1 and leads to an 
increase in its relative price and the interest rate. In the new equilibrium the induced price 
increase has moderated but not reversed the initial impact of the increase in 𝐵1 on output in 
sector 1. More agents in sector 2 than in sector 1 obtain external finance .  
3.2. Closed-Economy FCE Equilibrium with Banks 
Suppose that the equilibrium without banks is such that some endowments are invested in the 
storage technology. Then the introduction of monitoring (banks) can enhance welfare by 
mobilizing resources from the CRS to the stochastic technologies.
13
 Once more, we can either 
have an equilibrium with or without investment in the CRS technology. We will focus on 
FCE (𝑅 = 1 + 𝑃), that is where some endowments are invested in the CRS technology.14 
Once more, the total investment in the CRS technology will be equal to the excess supply in 
the financial market when 𝑅 = 1 + 𝑃: 
 𝑍 = 1 − [2 − 𝐴𝑙
1 − 𝐴𝑙
2]𝐼 − 𝑐[(𝐴ℎ
1 − 𝐴𝑙
1) + (𝐴ℎ
2 − 𝐴𝑙
2)]    (9) 
Now, the demand for funds comes from entrepreneurs who borrow either from the capital 
market 𝐴ℎ
𝑗 < 𝐴 < 1 or banks 𝐴𝑙
𝑗 < 𝐴 < 𝐴ℎ
𝑗
, 𝑗 = 1,2. For the latter group we also have added 
on the demand side the resources spent on monitoring. 
The new goods market clearing condition is given by: 
∫ (𝜃𝑌1 −
𝜃𝑃𝑌1−(𝐼−𝐴)(1+𝑃)
2𝑃
)
1
𝐴ℎ
1 𝑑𝐴 + ∫ (𝜃𝑌1 −
𝜃𝑃𝑌1−(𝐼+𝑐−𝐴)(1+𝑃)
2𝑃
)
𝐴ℎ
1
𝐴𝑙
1 𝑑𝐴 + 𝑍 = ∫
𝐴(1+𝑃)
2𝑃
𝑑𝐴
𝐴𝑙
1
0
+
∫
𝐴(1+𝑃)
2𝑃
𝑑𝐴
𝐴𝑙
2
0
+ ∫  (
𝜃 𝑌2−(𝐼−𝐴)(1+𝑃)
2𝑃
)
1
𝐴ℎ
2 𝑑𝐴 + ∫ (
𝜃𝑌2−(𝐼+𝑐−𝐴)(1+𝑃)
2𝑃
)
𝐴ℎ
2
𝐴𝑙
2 𝑑𝐴  
The two terms on the left hand side are equal to the net supply (production minus 
consumption) of good 1 by those entrepreneurs who borrow from the capital market and by 
those who borrow from banks, respectively, and the last term is equal to the quantity of good 
1 produced using the CRS technology. The first two terms on the right-hand side are equal to 
the demand for good 1 by those agents of each skill-type who are either lenders or monitors 
                                                          
13 The argument does not depend on the number of sectors in the economy and thus without any loss of 
generality suppose that there is a single good in the economy. Begin by considering the case where the 
equilibrium interest rate under banking is equal to the return of the CRS technology. Given that the return of the 
stochastic technology dominates the return of the CRS technology all those agents that borrow from banks are 
strictly better off under the banking equilibrium. Moreover, the equality of the equilibrium interest rates under 
banking and in the absence of banks implies that the welfare of all other agents remains the same. Next, consider 
the case when the equilibrium interest rate under banking is higher than the return of the CRS technology. The 
only complication now is that the increase in the interest rate implies that those agents that borrow from the 
capital market are worse off while all lenders are better off. However, these are only distributional effects. 
14
 It is the more plausible case as there is always some investment in low risk assets. 
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and the last two terms are equal to the demand for good 1 by the producers of good 2. Using 
(9) we can rewrite the above condition as: 
(1 − 𝑃)𝑍 = 𝜃𝑃𝑌1[1 − 𝐴𝑙
1] − 𝜃𝑌2[1 − 𝐴𝑙
2]                (10) 
3.2.1. Bank Finance Dependence 
Condition (8) defines sector 𝑗’s requirements for market finance. Its requirements for bank 
finance (𝐵𝐹𝑗) and external (total) finance (𝐸𝐹𝑗), are given by:   
 𝐵𝐹𝑗 = ∫ [𝐼 − 𝐴
𝐴ℎ
𝑗
𝐴𝑙
𝑗 ]𝑑𝐴 + ∫ 𝑐𝑑𝐴 = [𝐼 −
𝐴ℎ
𝑗
+𝐴𝑙
𝑗
2
] [𝐴ℎ
𝑗 − 𝐴𝑙
𝑗] + 𝑐[𝐴ℎ
𝑗 − 𝐴𝑙
𝑗]
𝐴ℎ
𝑗
𝐴𝑙
𝑗               (11) 
 𝐸𝐹𝑗 = ∫ [𝐼 − 𝐴
1
𝐴𝑙
𝑗 ]𝑑𝐴 + ∫ 𝑐𝑑𝐴
𝐴ℎ
𝑗
𝐴𝑙
𝑗 = [𝐼 −
1+𝐴𝑙
𝑗
2
] [1 − 𝐴𝑙
𝑗] + 𝑐[𝐴ℎ
𝑗 − 𝐴𝑙
𝑗]           (12) 
With both financing options available, we say that sector 𝑗  is more external finance 
dependent than sector 𝑖 if 𝐸𝐹𝑗 > 𝐸𝐹𝑖, and we define a sector 𝑗’s ‘bank dependence’ (𝐵𝐷𝑗) as 
the ratio of its total borrowing from banks to its total external finance – i.e.  
 𝐵𝐷𝑗 =
𝐵𝐹𝑗
𝐸𝐹𝑗
=
[𝐼−
𝐴
ℎ
𝑗
+𝐴
𝑙
𝑗 
2
][𝐴ℎ
𝑗
−𝐴𝑙
𝑗
]+𝑐[𝐴ℎ
𝑗
−𝐴𝑙
𝑗
]
[𝐼−
1+𝐴
𝑙
𝑗
2
][1−𝐴𝑙
𝑗
]+𝑐[𝐴ℎ
𝑗
−𝐴𝑙
𝑗
]
                       (13) 
At this point we introduce an assumption that is sufficient for us to identify relative bank 
dependence: 
Assumption 1.  𝜃𝑌 > [1 + 𝑏]
𝐵1+𝐵1
2
 
Our model requires 𝜃𝑌𝑗 > 𝐵𝑗(> 𝑏𝐵𝑗) for the advanced technology to be employed using 
market (bank) finance. This assumption strengthens this requirement. 
Proposition 2: Consider the equilibrium when 𝑌1 = 𝑌2 = 𝑌  and 𝐵1 > 𝐵2 . Then we can 
show that: 
(a) 𝑃 > 1, and 
(b) 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 1 is sufficient for Sector 1 to be the more bank finance dependent 
sector.  
Proof: See Appendix 1. 
At the initial relative price, the increase in 𝐵1 reduces good 1 output, thereby creating an 
excess demand which increases this good’s relative price. The increase in P has both price 
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and interest rate effects in sector 1, which tend to reduce both thresholds in this sector as the 
price effects dominate; and interest rate effects in sector 2 which tend to increase both its 
thresholds. Nevertheless, the induced relative price increase cannot be so large as to 
completely reverse the relative output changes, implying that in the new equilibrium 𝐴𝑙
1 > 𝐴𝑙
2. 
This, with 𝐵1 > 𝐵2 in turn implies 𝐴ℎ
1 > 𝐴ℎ
2 , and 𝐴ℎ
1 − 𝐴𝑙
1 > 𝐴ℎ
2 − 𝐴𝑙
2. A larger number of 
market financed projects and larger average market borrowing per project means that sector 2 
has greater access to market finance - 𝑀𝐹2 > 𝑀𝐹1. Sector 1 has the larger number of bank 
financed projects, but because both thresholds are higher in this sector, average bank 
borrowing per project is lower. Assumption 1 is sufficient to ensure that 𝐵𝐹1 > 𝐵𝐹2 , 
however, in which case sector 1 is the relatively bank finance dependent sector. In general we 
would expect sector 2, with its lower external finance threshold to be the more external 
finance dependent sector. The only influence working counter to this conclusion is the larger 
number of bank financed projects in sector 1 and their demand for additional capital (of c per 
project).  
3.3. The Open Economy 
Suppose that the world comprises two countries (Home and Foreign) that are initially 
identical in every respect. Agents can only borrow from domestic financial markets. It is clear 
that in this case the relative price will be the same in the two countries and there will be no 
international trade in goods. In what follows, we consider a change in one of the two 
countries and use the resulting trading equilibrium to identify the pattern of international 
trade and how these changes affect the development of financial markets. The first change 
will be an increase in the productivity of one of the two sectors. In this case, comparative 
advantage will be driven by differences in technologies. The second change will be a 
decrease in the efficiency of the banking system captured by an increase in 𝑏 in one country. 
Now financial institutions will provide the driving force behind comparative advantage.  
3.3.1. Technological Comparative Advantage  
Without any loss of generality, we consider an increase in 𝑌2 in Home. Then: 
Proposition 3: (Technological Comparative Advantage) Suppose that initially 𝑌1 = 𝑌2 and 
𝐵1 > 𝐵2. Consider an increase in 𝑌2 at Home. In the trading equilibrium 
(a) The home country produces relatively more of and therefore exports good 2; 
(b)  Sector 2 is the less bank dependent sector in the home country; and 
(c) Aggregate bank dependency is lower in the home country.  
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Proof: See Appendix 1. 
At the common free trade relative price (and hence common interest rate), the higher 
production efficiency of sector 2 in the Home country means that the external finance 
threshold is lower, and more capital is used under the stochastic technology. This yields an 
output gain to this sector in addition to the direct production efficiency gain. Home output of 
good 2 is higher and Home output of good 1 is the same as in the Foreign country, reflecting 
the Home country (Ricardian) comparative advantage in sector 2. The higher production 
efficiency in sector 2 also implies a lower market finance threshold and hence more market 
financed projects and a higher average borrowing per project. In fact both thresholds are 
lower by the same amount, implying that the numbers of bank financed projects in sector 2 
are unchanged. But because the Home bank-financed entrepreneurs have lower average asset 
holdings, they borrow more per project so that bank financing in sector 2 also increases. The 
increased market finance dominates, however, and the bank dependency of sector 2 is lower. 
Sector 1 remains relatively bank finance dependent at Home. With bank dependency the 
same in sector 1 in both countries, and bank dependency in sector 2 lower at Home, the 
Home country shows a lower aggregate bank dependency.   
In summary, if a country has a Ricardian comparative advantage in the non-bank-finance 
dependent sector it will export the non-bank-finance dependent good and its economy will 
exhibit a relatively lower dependence on bank finance.  
3.3.2. Institutional Comparative Advantage  
We now consider how country differences in the efficiency of bank financial systems affect 
comparative advantage. Without any loss of generality, consider a higher 𝑏 implying a lower 
banking efficiency in the Home country. Then: 
Proposition 4: (Institutional Comparative Advantage) Suppose that initially both countries 
are identical with 𝑌1 = 𝑌2  and 𝐵1 > 𝐵2 Consider an increase in 𝑏 at Home. Then in the 
trading equilibrium 
(a) Home produces relatively more of and therefore exports good 2; 
(b) Home has the lower bank dependency in each sector, so aggregate bank 
dependency is lower; and 
(c) Sector 1 is relatively bank finance dependent at Home. 
Proof: See Appendix 1.  
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At the common free trade relative price (and hence common interest rate), a less efficient 
banking system at Home means lower output of both goods, but relatively lower output of 
good 1 because sector 1 is bank dependent (𝐵1 > 𝐵2). Home exports good 2, the relatively 
non-bank-finance dependent good. While access to market finance in each sector is the same 
in the two countries, the Home bank-finance asset threshold is higher in both sectors 
implying both sectors are less bank finance dependent than their Foreign counterparts. Home 
therefore shows a lower aggregate bank dependency   
In summary, if a country has a relatively less efficient banking sector it will export the less bank 
dependent good and will exhibit a relatively lower dependence on bank finance. 
 
4. Financial vs Technological Comparative Advantage 
Our theoretical model offers two possible explanations for the link between financial market 
architecture and the patterns of international trade. According to the first explanation export 
patterns are driven by comparative advantage in financial architecture. The alternative 
explanation identifies cross-country technological differences as the main source of 
comparative advantage. Certainly, there is no reason to believe that these two causal 
interpretations are mutually exclusive. Over time financial development and technological 
change might co-evolve producing rich dynamical patterns. In this section, we turn our 
attention once more to the data and look for evidence supporting either/both of the above two 
theoretical interpretations. 
4.1. Financial Markets Drive the Patterns of Trade 
Our methodology in this section follows closely Manova (2008). The identification strategy 
relies on time variation in the patterns of exports due to the liberalization of equity markets. 
The underlying hypothesis in Manova (2008) is that the development of equity markets 
following their liberalization would advantage sectors that are more dependent on external 
finance. However, if, as our model suggest, financial architecture matters then the 
liberalization of equity markets would have particularly favored those sectors that are more 
dependent on market finance and less so on bank loans. 
We estimate the following model:  
𝑋𝑐𝑖𝑡  =  𝛼 0  + 𝛽0𝐿𝑖𝑏𝑐𝑡 +  𝛽1(𝐵𝐹𝐷𝑖  ×  𝐿𝑖𝑏𝑐𝑡) + 𝛽2 (𝐸𝐹𝐷 𝑖 × 𝐿𝑖𝑏𝑐𝑡 )  + 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑐𝑡 +  𝛾𝑐 + 𝛾𝑖 +
                            𝛾𝑡 +  𝜀𝑐𝑖𝑡        (14) 
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Our focus is on the interaction term between a sector’s bank dependence (𝐵𝐹𝐷𝑖) and the 
country’s equity market status (𝐿𝑖𝑏𝑐𝑡). We expect a negative coefficient for this interaction 
term indicating that when countries liberalize their equity market they experience a 
disproportional boost of their exports from sectors that are relatively less bank dependent. 
The dummy variable 𝐿𝑖𝑏𝑐𝑡 indicates whether the equity market in country 𝑐 at time 𝑡 
is liberalized and is zero in all years before, and one in all years after the official equity 
market liberalization date. A similar dummy referring to the “first sign” of an upcoming 
liberalization is used as an alternative variable for liberalization.
15
 These two variables 
previously used by Manova (2008), have been computed by Bekaert et al (2002, 2005).
16
 In 
our sample, 14 countries liberalized their equity market during the observation period, while 
16 countries did so prior to 1980. 
As in section 2, 𝑋𝑐𝑖𝑡 is a measure of the log of export for country 𝑐 in industry  𝑖 but 
now also for each year 𝑡 in the period 1980-2004. The two indices are defined as above. We 
also control for cross-country and across time differences in national incomes (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑐𝑡). Lastly, 
we introduce a set of country, sector and year fixed effects. Because of possible serial 
correlation over time, we cluster the standard errors at the level of the explanatory variable, 
i.e. sector-country level (see Angrist and Pischke, 2009). 
Table 4 shows our results. In the first column, we evaluate the impact of equity 
liberalization on export patterns using the official date of liberalization. We also interact the 
liberalization dummy with each sector’s bank dependence. We consistently estimate a 
strongly negative and highly significant coefficient. Conditional on GDP, general time trends, 
and country and industry invariant characteristics captured by the country and industry fixed 
effects, we find a disproportionally  large  effect  of  equity liberalization  on  the  exports  of  
sectors which rely relatively less on banks compared to equity markets. Using the coefficients 
𝛽0 and 𝛽1 estimated in column I, equity liberalization increases the value of trade by 40.4 
percent in a sector relying only on market finance (BFD = 0), while it decreases trade by 94.4 
percent (0.404-1.348) in a sector relying only on bank finance (BFD = 1). In the second 
column, we use the alternative dating for equity liberalization captured by the “first sign” 
dummy. Our results remain robust when using this indicator. This alternative dating method 
                                                          
15
  Manova (2008) also uses two alternative measures of liberalization, namely: i) an index that is zero before, 
and ranges between zero and one in all years after the official liberalization, where the index value captures the 
reform intensity, and ii) an analogous index for the “first sign” of liberalization. The information on reform 
intensity is not available for many countries of our sample which prevents us from using these alternative 
measures in our study. 
16
For some countries we rely on the dataset provided by Bekaert and Harvey (2004). 
20 
 
alleviates concerns about possible anticipation effects. Finally, in columns III and IV, we 
introduce the interaction term between external finance dependence (EFD) and the equity 
liberalization dummy. Like Manova (2008), we obtain a positive and significant coefficient 
indicating a disproportionally  large  effect  of  liberalization  on  the  exports  of  sectors  
with  higher external finance dependence. Clearly, our results are complementary to those 
already reported in the literature.  
In order to test their robustness, we have re-estimated the results presented in Table 4 
using country-industry fixed effects instead of country and industry fixed effects. We have 
also clustered the standard errors at either the country or the industry level. In all these 
specifications, for which we omit the detailed results, our coefficient of interest (𝛽1) remains 
positive and significant at least at the 10 percent level. These robustness checks are presented 
in Appendix 3. 
As we already know, the development of financial markets offers an advantage to 
those sectors that are financially dependent. Our work suggests that financial market 
architecture also matters.  
Table 4: Financial Market Development and Comparative Advantage 
Equity liberalization date    Official     First sign    Official First sign 
 I II III IV 
Equity Liberalization 0.404*** 0.374*** 0.321*** 0.216 
 
(0.083) (0.096) (0.117) (0.132) 
     
Equity Liberalization -1.348*** -1.174*** -1.256*** -1.001** 
   * Bank Finance Dependence (BFD) (0.315) (0.368) (0.338) (0.393) 
     
Equity Liberalization    0.263 0.494** 
   * External Finance Dependence (EFD)   (0.220) (0.251) 
     
ln GDP 0.300 0.323* 0.302 0.327* 
 (0.194) (0.195) (0.193) (0.193) 
  
Observations 18,078 18,078 18,078 18,078 
R-squared 0.803 0.803 0.803 0.803 
The dependent variable is the log of exports to the rest of the world by each 3-digit ISIC sector for the 
years 1979-2004. The Bank Finance Dependence variable is defined in section 2.1. All regressions include a 
constant term, year and exporter and sector fixed effects, and cluster errors at the exporter-industry level. 
Standard-errors reported in parentheses. ***, **, *, indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
4.2. Technology Drives the Patterns of Trade 
In this section we assess whether a country’s financial market architecture is driven by the 
requirements of exporting sectors. Our estimation strategy follows Do and Levchenko (2007). 
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First, we construct a variable summarizing a country’s need for bank finance depending on its 
exports from each sector. Second, we generate an instrument for this variable by estimating 
the eﬀect of geography variables on trade volumes across sectors. We then evaluate how 
cross-country differences in bank finance requirements impact a country’s financial market 
architecture. 
We combine our industry-level measure of bank dependence (BFD) with data on the 
structure of a country’s exports to develop a measure of a country’s requirement of bank 
loans to finance exports (hereafter BFNX). In particular, we construct the following variable 
for each country. 
 𝐵𝐹𝑁𝑋𝑐  =  ∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑐𝐵𝐹𝐷𝑖
𝐼
𝑖=1 with 𝜔𝑖𝑐 =
𝑋𝑖𝑐
∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑐
𝐼
𝑖=1
     (15) 
where 𝜔𝑖𝑐 is the year 2000 share of sector 𝑖’s exports 𝑋𝑖𝑐  in total exports of country 𝑐 for the 
year and 𝐵𝐹𝐷𝑖 is our measure of sector 𝑖’s bank dependence defined above. In order to assess 
the robustness of our results we also construct in a similar way a variable that measures the 
external finance requirements for financing exports (𝐸𝐹𝑁𝑋𝑐), by replacing 𝐵𝐹𝐷𝑖 by 𝐸𝐹𝐷𝑖 in 
(15). 
Table F of Appendix 4 presents the results from the cross-sectional OLS regression 
between countries’ bank development and their requirements for bank finance, without 
relying on the IV strategy. The level of bank development of a country (𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑐) appears 
to be positively and significantly correlated with its export dependence on bank finance 
(BFNX). This is the case for both of our definitions of bank development. It is also robust to 
the introduction of the EFNX variable. 
Of course, such a correlation would not imply causation. In order to assess the causal 
link between the sectoral composition of exports of a country and their impact on the 
development of the country’s banking sector, we rely on an IV strategy. In order to deal with 
this endogeneity issue, we follow closely the instrumentation strategy developed by Do and 
Levchenko (2007). We build our instrument in a similar way as 𝐵𝐹𝑁𝑋𝑐  but where 𝜔𝑖𝑐  is 
obtained from the predicted export values obtained from a gravity equation using bilateral 
trades on a cross section of 170 countries that we run for each of the 28 sectors independently. 
The data and the gravity equation estimated are identical to those used by Do and Levchenko 
(2007). The identification is made possible as the sectoral coefficients associate with standard 
gravity variables, such as distance or common border, are different for each sector. As a 
result, countries which are far away from their trading partners will have lower predicted 
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export shares in sectors for which the coeﬃcient on distance is higher. From these variations, 
we obtain predicted values for 𝑋𝑖𝑐 that vary across countries and also across sectors. We can 
then use these values to construct a ‘Predicted BNX’ variable. 17  We then use this new 
variable to estimate the following system of equations: 
 𝐅𝐢𝐫𝐬𝐭 𝐒𝐭𝐚𝐠𝐞:        𝐵𝐹𝑁𝑋𝑐   =  𝑎 0  + 𝑏1𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝐹𝑁𝑋𝑐  + 𝛿𝑍𝑐 +  𝜖𝑐 
𝐒𝐞𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐝 𝐒𝐭𝐚𝐠𝐞:        𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑐   =  𝛼 0  +  𝛽1𝐵𝐹𝑁?̂?𝑐  +  𝛾𝑍𝑐 +  𝜀𝑐 
In the first stage, the left-hand side variable is a country’s export dependence on bank finance, 
while the right-hand side includes the `predicted’ export dependence on bank finance, as well 
as some other control variables Z. In the second stage, the left-hand side variable is the 
measure of a country’s bank development defined in section 2.2. We expect the requirement 
of bank finance for exports to impact positively the level of bank development of a country, 
𝛽1 > 0.  
In Table 5, we estimate a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression where we 
instrument BFNX using its predicted value obtained from the sectoral gravity equations. The 
top panel contains the full results of the second stage of the regression, while the bottom 
panel reports only the coefficient on the predicted BFNX from the first stage. For ease of 
exposition, for the ﬁrst stage, we only report the coeﬃcient and the standard errors associated 
with our instrument. The level of bank development of a country (𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑐) appears to be 
positively and significantly affected by the export dependence on bank finance (BFNX). This 
is the case for both of our definitions of bank development (see columns I and II). It is also 
robust to the introduction of the EFNX variable (see columns III and IV). The estimates are 
significant at 5% in columns I and II, at 1% in columns III and IV. The 2SLS coefficients 
obtained for BFNX are about twice as large as the corresponding OLS coefficients. The 
coefficient obtained in column III (𝛽1 = 3.628), implies that going from the first to the third 
quartile in term of export need for bank finance (respectively 0.152 and 0.202) is associated 
with an increase of the bank development of a country from 0.55 to 0.75. This is similar to 
going from the financial architecture observed in France to that observed in Japan (see 
Column 1 of Table 2).  
                                                          
17
 A potential issue when constructing our instrumental variable is the large number of industry-country-pairs 
with zero trade observations. Following Do and Levchenko (2007) our instrument can be constructed either by 
predicting trade value even for observations that are zero, or by dropping those observations. Table 5 reports 
results using the first methodology. Very similar results can be obtained when dropping the zeros, where the 
variables of interest remain significant at least at the 10 percent level both in the first and in the second stage. 
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Looking at the first stage, the Predicted BFNX is significant at 5% in columns I and II, 
and at the 1% level in columns III and IV. When only one instrument is used, Stock and 
Yogo (2005) suggest that a reliable instrument would be associated with a F-statistic above 
10. The F-statistic associated with the instrument is 4.57 in columns I and II, which is a sign 
of a weak instrument. Of course, this speciﬁcation may be flawed by an omitted variable bias. 
As we introduce the EFNX variable as a control variable, the F-stat increases to 13.75. This 
suggests that the inference based on this instrument is indeed reliable. The introduction of 
other control variables may raise other endogeneity concerns. Following Angrist and Pischke 
(2009, pp. 217-18), the F-stats that we report in Table 5 are the Angrist-Pischke F-stat, and so, 
do not suffer from such problems. 
A limitation of our estimation is the limited number of observations used for our 
estimation. Panel estimation may have been preferable but the limited number of years for 
which the variable BankDev is available makes this approach infeasible. 
Table 5: Export Bank Dependence and Financial Architecture: Instruments 
Bank Development measure BankDev1 BankDev2 BankDev1 BankDev2 
 I II III IV 
 Panel A: Second Stage 
External Bank Finance need for export  3.901** 4.070** 3.628*** 3.639*** 
 (BFNX) (1.983) (1.774) (1.321) (1.267) 
     
External Finance need for export   0.089 0.141 
(EFNX)   (0.439) (0.370) 
  
 Panel B: First Stage 
Predicted BFNX 1.429** 1.429** 2.725*** 2.725*** 
 (0.669) (0.669) (0.735) (0.735) 
     
# Observations 30 30 30 30 
F-Stat 4.57 4.57 13.75 13.75 
In the second stage, the dependent variable is a country’s banking sector development for the year 2000 defined 
in section 22. All regressions include a constant term. Standard-errors reported in parentheses. ***, **, *, 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
Overall, our results of this section suggest that the evolution of financial market 
architecture is affected by the financial requirements of sectors with strong exports, a good 
indicator technological comparative advantage.  
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5. Concluding Comments 
In this paper we have established a link between financial market architecture and export 
patterns. We started our work by providing some evidence offering support to the Allen and 
Gale (2001) conjecture about the existence of this link. Then we presented a two-country 
model where both banks and financial markets co-exist that offered two possible causal 
explanations for the conjecture. According to one explanation financial market development 
is the driver of the relationship. In countries with highly efficient banking systems the sectors 
that are more likely to have a comparative advantage are those sectors that rely more on bank 
finance. The alternative explanation identifies technology as the variable driving the 
relationship. Countries with a comparative advantage in sectors that rely on banks for their 
financial needs are more likely to develop their banking sectors.  
 By employing methods already applied in the fast growing literature that explores the 
relationship between financial markets and trade we have provided evidence supporting both 
theoretical mechanisms. On the one hand, the evidence suggests that the evolution of 
financial market architecture exerts a bias on export patterns. In particular, changes that favor 
the equity market relative to the banking sector will have a positive impact on those sectors of 
the economy that are relatively more dependent on direct finance. On the other hand, our 
empirical work also suggests that sectors that have a technological advantage also have a 
significant impact on the evolution of financial market architecture.  
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Table 1: Bank Finance Dependence (BFD)  and External Finance 
Dependence (EFD) by sector 
 
 
Industry Name (Industry code) 
Bank Finance 
Dependence 
(BFD) 
External 
Finance 
Dependence 
(EFD) 
Food products (311)  0.201 0.137 
Beverages (313) 0.222 0.077 
Tobacco (314) 0.000 -0.451 
Textiles (321) 0.430 0.400 
Wearing apparel, except footwear (322) 1.000 0.029 
Leather (323) 0.835 -0.140 
Footwear (324) 0.213 -0.078 
Wood products, except furniture (331) 0.106 0.284 
Furniture, except metal (332) 0.224 0.236 
Paper and products (341) 0.016 0.176 
Printing and publishing (342) 0.058 0.204 
Industrial chemicals (351) 0.044 0.253 
Other chemicals (352) 0.266 0.219 
Petroleum Refineries (353) 0.061 0.042 
Misc. petroleum and coal products (354) 0.061 0.334 
Rubber products (355) 0.240 0.226 
Plastic products (356) 0.139 1.140 
Pottery, china, earthenware (361) 0.347 -0.146 
Glass and products (362) 0.075 0.528 
Other non-metallic products (369) 0.107 0.062 
Iron and steel (371) 0.082 0.087 
Non-ferrous metals (372) 0.091 0.005 
Fabricated metal products (381) 0.252 0.237 
Machinery, except electrical (382) 0.098 0.445 
Machinery, electric (383) 0.011 0.767 
Transport equipment (384) 0.358 0.307 
Prof and scientific equipment (385) 0.000 0.961 
Other manufactured products (390) 0.408 0.470 
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Appendix 1   
Proof of Proposition 1 
(a) Totally differentiating (7) we obtain: 
{−𝑍 + (1 − 𝑃) [
1
(1+𝑃)2
(𝜃𝑃𝑌 − 𝐵1) −
𝜃𝑌
1+𝑃
+
1
(1+𝑃)2
(𝜃𝑌 − 𝐵2)] −   𝜃𝑌(1 − 𝐴ℎ
1 ) +
𝜃𝑃𝑌
1
(1+𝑃)2
(𝜃𝑃𝑌 − 𝐵1) −
(𝜃𝑌)2𝑃
1+𝑃
− 𝜃𝑌
1
(1+𝑃)2
(𝜃𝑌 − 𝐵2)} 𝑑𝑃 = − {
(1−𝑃)𝐼
1+𝑃
+
𝜃𝑃𝑌
1+𝑃
} 𝑑𝐵1   
Evaluating this expression at the initial symmetric equilibrium, thus setting 𝑃 = 1  and 
𝐵1 = 𝐵2, we find that 
𝑑𝑃
𝑑𝐵1
> 0. 
(b) The induced increase in P raises the interest rate (𝑅 = 1 + 𝑃) which in turn increases 
thresholds in both sectors. In sector 1, the direct price effect dominates the (indirect) interest 
rate effect, as shown by  
𝜕𝐴ℎ
1
𝜕𝑃
= −
𝜃𝑌+𝐵1
[𝑅]2
< 0;   
𝜕𝐴𝑙
1
𝜕𝑃
= −
𝜃𝑌+𝑏𝐵1
[𝑅]2
< 0, and the price increase 
moderates but does not reverse the effects of the increase in 𝐵1 in reducing the output sector 
1. This implies that in the new equilibrium 𝐴ℎ
1 > 𝐴ℎ
2 . A larger number of market financed 
projects and larger average market borrowing per project means that sector 2 has greater 
access to external finance - 𝐸𝐹2 > 𝐸𝐹1.  
Proof of Proposition 2 
(a) 𝑃 > 1 . At the initial relative price, an increase in 𝐵1  increases the external finance 
threshold (𝐴𝑙
1) in sector 1. This leads to a reduction in good 1 output and an excess demand 
for good 1 which increases its relative price. Totally differentiating (10) we obtain: 
{−𝑍 + (1 − 𝑃) [
1
(1+𝑃)2
(𝜃𝑃𝑌 − 𝐵1) −
𝜃𝑌
1+𝑃
+
1
(1+𝑃)2
(𝜃𝑌 − 𝐵2) −
2𝛾
(1+𝑃)2
] − 𝜃𝑌(1 − 𝐴𝑙
1) +
𝜃𝑃𝑌
1
(1+𝑃)2
(𝜃𝑃𝑌 − 𝑏𝐵1) −
(𝜃𝑌)2𝑃
1+𝑃
− 𝜃𝑌
1
(1+𝑃)2
(𝜃𝑌 − 𝑏𝐵2)} 𝑑𝑃 = − {
(1−𝑃)
1+𝑃
(𝐼 − (1 − 𝑏)𝑐) +
𝜃𝑃𝑌
1+𝑃
𝑏} 𝑑𝐵1    
Evaluating this expression at the initial symmetric equilibrium (where 𝑃 = 1 and 𝐵1 = 𝐵2), 
we find that 
𝑑𝑃
𝑑𝐵1
=
𝜃𝑃𝑌
1+𝑃
𝑏
𝑍+𝜃𝑌(1−𝐴𝑙
1)+
(𝜃𝑌)2𝑃
1+𝑃
> 0. 
(b). 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 1 is sufficient for Sector 1 to be the more bank finance dependent sector. 
As in proposition 2(b), the induced increase in P raises the interest rate (𝑅 = 1 + 𝑃) which in 
turn increases thresholds in both sectors. In sector 1, the direct price effect, which tends to 
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reduce both thresholds, dominates the (indirect) interest rate effect, and the price increase 
moderates but does not reverse the effects of the increase in 𝐵1 in reducing the output sector 
1. This implies that in the new equilibrium 𝐴𝑙
1 > 𝐴𝑙
2 which from (2) requires  𝜃𝑃𝑌 − 𝑏𝐵1 <
𝜃𝑌 − 𝑏𝐵2. In turn this implies 𝜃𝑃𝑌 − 𝐵1 < 𝜃𝑌 − 𝐵2 and hence, from (1), that 𝐴ℎ
1 > 𝐴ℎ
2 . A 
larger number of market financed projects and larger average market borrowing per project 
means that sector 2 has greater access to market finance - 𝑀𝐹2 > 𝑀𝐹1.  
Since 𝐵𝐷𝑗 =
𝐵𝐹𝑗
𝐸𝐹𝑗
=
𝐵𝐹𝑗
𝐵𝐹𝑗+𝑀𝐹𝑗
, we know 𝐵𝐷1 > 𝐵𝐷2 iff   
𝐵𝐹1
𝑀𝐹1
>
𝐵𝐹2
𝑀𝐹2
  or 
𝐵𝐹1
𝐵𝐹2
>
𝑀𝐹1
𝑀𝐹2
. We have 
just shown that  𝑀𝐹2 > 𝑀𝐹1 , so 𝐵𝐹1 > 𝐵𝐹2  is sufficient for sector 1 to be the bank 
dependent sector. Consider  
 𝐵𝐹1 − 𝐵𝐹2 = {𝐼 + 𝑐 −
𝐴ℎ
1 +𝐴𝑙
1
2
} {𝐴ℎ
1 − 𝐴𝑙
1} − {𝐼 + 𝑐 −
𝐴ℎ
2 +𝐴𝑙
2
2
} {𝐴ℎ
2 − 𝐴𝑙
2} 
Using 𝐴ℎ
𝑗 − 𝐴𝑙
𝑗 =
𝐵𝑗
𝑅
[1 − 𝑏] , we see that 𝐴ℎ
1 − 𝐴𝑙
1 > 𝐴ℎ
2 − 𝐴𝑙
2 , so sector 1 has the larger 
number of bank financed projects. But both thresholds are higher in sector 1, implying lower 
average borrowing per bank-financed project. After substituting from (1) and (2) we obtain  
 𝐵𝐹1 − 𝐵𝐹2 = {
𝐵1
𝑅
[1 − 𝑏] − 𝑐} {
𝑐
2
+
1
2𝑅
[(𝜃𝑃𝑌 − 𝐵1) + (𝜃𝑃𝑌 − 𝑏𝐵1)]} 
   − {
𝐵2
𝑅
[1 − 𝑏] − 𝑐} {
𝑐
2
+
1
2𝑅
[(𝜃𝑌 − 𝐵2) + (𝜃𝑌 − 𝑏𝐵2)]} 
Inspection of this expression shows that a sufficient condition for 𝐵𝐹1 > 𝐵𝐹2 is that 
 𝐵1[(𝜃𝑃𝑌 − 𝐵1) + (𝜃𝑃𝑌 − 𝑏𝐵1)] > 𝐵2[(𝜃𝑌 − 𝐵2) + (𝜃𝑌 − 𝑏𝐵2)] 
If this expression is satisfied at 𝑃 = 1, then it is satisfied for  𝑃 > 1; so setting 𝑃 = 1 and 
rearranging we obtain our Assumption 1  𝜃𝑌 > [1 + 𝑏]
𝐵1+𝐵2
2
. 
 Note: We also show the following: 
Relative External Finance Dependence is ambiguous:  From (12) we have 𝐸𝐹𝑗 =
{𝐼 −
1+𝐴𝑙
𝑗
2
} [1 − 𝐴𝑙
𝑗] + 𝑐[𝐴ℎ
𝑗 − 𝐴𝑙
𝑗]. Since 𝐴𝑙
1 > 𝐴𝑙
2, the number of externally financed projects 
is higher in Sector 2. But the number of bank financed projects is higher in sector 1, and since 
bank financed projects require additional (borrowed) capital of c, it is possible that sector 1 
has the greater recourse to external finance. Substituting from (1) and (2) and simplifying, we 
find that  
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 𝐸𝐹2 − 𝐸𝐹1 =
1
2
{{
𝜃𝑌−𝑏𝐵2
𝑅
}
2
− {
𝜃𝑃𝑌−𝑏𝐵1
𝑅
}
2
} −
𝑐
𝑅
{[𝜃𝑌 − 𝐵2] − [𝜃𝑃𝑌 − 𝐵1]} 
Since both terms in parentheses are positive the sign is ambiguous, but it is more likely to be 
positive the smaller is c.   
Proof of Proposition 3  
(a) The home country produces relatively more of and therefore exports good 2. Consider 
the difference in outputs between the home and foreign countries in the trading equilibrium, 
where both face the same relative price and interest rate, but 𝑌2 > 𝑌1 at Home . 
𝑄1 = 𝑍 + 𝜃𝑃𝑌1[1 − 𝐴𝑙
1] and 𝑄2 = 𝑍 + 𝜃𝑌2[1 − 𝐴𝑙
2] 
So that in comparing the home with the foreign country we have 
 𝑑[𝑄1 − 𝑄2] = −𝜃 {[1 − 𝐴𝑙
2] − 𝑌2
𝜕𝐴𝑙
2
𝜕𝑌2
} 𝑑𝑌2 = −𝜃 {[1 − 𝐴𝑙
2] + 𝑌2
𝜃
𝑅
} 𝑑𝑌2 < 0 
If Home has a superior technology in good 2 it produces relatively more of good 2 at any 
given relative prices and hence exports good 2 in the trading equilibrium.  
(b) Sector 2 is the less bank dependent sector in the Home country. In the trading 
equilibrium the sectors in the Home country face the same relative price and interest rate but 
differ in two respects - 𝐵1 > 𝐵2   and 𝑌2 > 𝑌1 . In Proposition 3(b) we established that 
Assumption 1 was sufficient for sector 1 to be relatively bank finance dependent if 𝐵1 > 𝐵2. 
Thus as long as the improvement in technology in sector 2 does not lead it to become more 
bank dependent, we expect sector 1 to remain the relatively bank finance dependent sector in 
the home country.  
Given the relative price (hence the same interest rate), the effect of the increase in 𝑌2 
on the thresholds in sector 2 in the Home country are 
𝜕𝐴ℎ
2
𝜕𝑌2
= −
𝜃
𝑅
=
𝜕𝐴𝑙
2
𝜕𝑌2
 . Both thresholds fall 
by the same amount. This implies more projects are market financed in sector 2, and because 
the marginal projects are by less wealthy asset owners, the average amount borrowed also 
increases. So market finance unambiguously increases. So does bank finance. Although the 
number of projects subject to bank financing is unchanged, the relatively more wealthy bank 
borrowers have been able to switch to market finance and have been replaced by poorer 
borrowers. The net result is the same number of projects but an increase in average borrowing. 
Total external finance clearly increases. These results are confirmed by  
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𝜕𝑀𝐹2
𝜕𝑌2
=
𝜃
𝑅
{𝐼 − 𝐴ℎ
2 } > 0 
            
𝜕𝐵𝐹2
𝜕𝑌2
= −
𝜃
𝑅
{𝐼 + 𝑐 − 𝐴ℎ
2 } +
𝜃
𝑅
{𝐼 + 𝑐 − 𝐴𝑙
2} =
𝜃
𝑅
[𝐴ℎ
2 − 𝐴𝑙
2] > 0 
 
𝜕𝐸𝐹2
𝜕𝑌2
=
𝜃
𝑅
{𝐼 − 𝐴𝑙
2} > 0 
Looking at bank finance dependency in sector 2 we have 
 𝐵𝐷2 =
𝐵𝐹2
𝐸𝐹2
=
𝐵𝐹2
𝑀𝐹2+𝐵𝐹2
 
So      𝑑𝐵𝐷2 =
𝑀𝐹2𝑑𝐵𝐹2−𝐵𝐹2𝑑𝑀𝐹2
[𝐸𝐹2]2
=
𝜃
𝑅
1
[𝐸𝐹2]2
{𝑀𝐹2[𝐴ℎ
2 − 𝐴𝑙
2] − 𝐵𝐹2[𝐼 − 𝐴ℎ
2 ]} 
 𝑑𝐵𝐷2 = −
𝜃
𝑅
[𝐼−𝐴ℎ
2 ][𝐴ℎ
2 −𝐴𝑙
2]
[𝐸𝐹2]2
{
[𝐼−𝐴𝑙
2]
2
+ 𝑐} < 0 
That is, the bank dependency of sector 2 falls in the Home country as a result of the 
improvement in its technology.  
(c) Aggregate bank dependency is lower in the Home country. The difference between 
aggregate bank finance dependency in the Home and Foreign countries in the trading 
equilibrium can be derived in a similar way. 
 𝐵𝐷 =
𝐵𝐹
𝐸𝐹
  
so  𝑑𝐵𝐷 =
𝐸𝐹𝑑𝐵𝐹−𝐵𝐹𝑑𝐸𝐹
[𝐸𝐹]2
=
1
𝐸𝐹
{𝑑𝐵𝐹2 − 𝐵𝐷𝑑𝐸𝐹2} 
Substituting from above 
 𝑑𝐵𝐷 =
1
𝐸𝐹
𝜃
𝑅
{[𝐴ℎ
2 − 𝐴𝑙
2] − 𝐵𝐷[𝐼 − 𝐴ℎ
2 ]} =
𝜃[𝐼−𝐴ℎ
2 ]
𝑅.𝐸𝐹.
{
[𝐴ℎ
2 −𝐴𝑙
2]
[𝐼−𝐴ℎ
2 ]
− 𝐵𝐷} 
Now  
[𝐴ℎ
2 −𝐴𝑙
2]
[𝐼−𝐴ℎ
2 ]
<
[𝐴ℎ
2 −𝐴𝑙
2]
[1−𝐴ℎ
2 ]
=
𝐵𝐹2
𝐵𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ 2
𝐸𝐹2
𝐸𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ 2
⁄ =
𝐵𝐹2
𝐸𝐹2
𝐸𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ 2
𝐵𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ 2
<
𝐵𝐹2
𝐸𝐹2
= 𝐵𝐷2 < 𝐵𝐷 
Where we have used 𝐼 > 1 and that average bank borrowing (𝐵𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ 2) is higher than average 
borrowing (𝐸𝐹̅̅ ̅̅ 2) since the agents with the least wealth are those that resort to bank finance.  
So 𝑑𝐵𝐷 < 0. Thus the aggregate bank dependency will be lower in the country with the 
comparative advantage in the non-bank dependent sector.  
Proof of Proposition 4  
Suppose the two countries are identical except that the home country has a less efficient 
banking sector.  
33 
 
(a) The home country produces relatively more of and therefore exports good 2. Consider the 
difference in outputs between the home and foreign countries in the trading equilibrium.  
𝑄1 = 𝑍 + 𝜃𝑃𝑌1[1 − 𝐴𝑙
1] and 𝑄2 = 𝑍 + 𝜃𝑌2[1 − 𝐴𝑙
2] 
Then  𝑑[𝑄1 − 𝑄2] = {−𝜃𝑃𝑌
𝜕𝐴𝑙
1
𝜕𝑏
+ 𝜃𝑌
𝜕𝐴𝑙
2
𝜕𝑏
} 𝑑𝑏 = −
𝜃𝑌
𝑅
{𝑃𝐵1 − 𝐵2}𝑑𝑏 
Implying 
𝜕[𝑄1−𝑄2]
𝜕𝑏
< 0 , since 𝐵1 > 𝐵2  and 𝑃 > 1 . So Home output of the relatively 
bank dependent sector is lower implying the Home imports this good.  
 (b) The Home country has the lower bank dependency in each sector, so aggregate bank 
dependency is lower at Home. With regard to the sources of finance, 𝑀𝐹𝑗 is unaffected by 
the change in b, but  
 
𝜕𝐸𝐹𝑗
𝜕𝑏
=
𝜕𝐵𝐹𝑗
𝜕𝑏
= −{𝐼 + 𝑐 − 𝐴𝑙
𝑗}
𝜕𝐴𝑙
𝑗
𝜕𝑏
= −{𝐼 + 𝑐 − 𝐴𝑙
𝑗}
𝐵𝑗
𝑅
< 0 
The demand for bank finance and external finance both fall in each sector. Also 
 𝑑𝐵𝐷𝑗 =
𝑀𝐹𝑗𝑑𝐵𝐹𝑗
[𝐸𝐹𝑗]
2 = −
𝑀𝐹𝑗
[𝐸𝐹2]2
{𝐼 + 𝑐 − 𝐴𝑙
𝑗}
𝐵𝑗
𝑅
< 0  
The country with the relatively less efficient banking sector has lower bank dependency in 
each sector. Given that access to market finance is the same in the two countries and that 
access to bank finance is lower in both sectors in the Home country, then Home bank 
dependency is lower in aggregate.  
(c) Sector 1 is relatively bank finance dependent in the Home country In the trading 
equilibrium the two Home sectors face the same relative price, interest rate and parameters 
except that 𝐵1 > 𝐵2. In Proposition 2(b) we established that Assumption 1 was sufficient for 
sector 1 to be the bank finance dependent sector in these circumstances. So provided 
Assumption 1 continues to hold at the higher b, and we assume that it does, then sector 1 is 
relatively bank finance dependent in the Home country.   
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Appendix 2 
Graph 1 presents the different point estimates and the 90% confidence intervals of 𝛽1, i.e. the 
interaction term “Bank Development * Bank Finance Dependence (BFD)” for several years. 
In Table 3 Column III, we estimate the following model for the year 2000: 
𝑋𝑐𝑖  =  𝛼 0  +  𝛽1(𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑐  ×  𝐵𝐹𝐷𝑖) + 𝛽2(𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑐  ×  𝐸𝐹𝐷𝑖  ) + 𝛾𝑐 + 𝛾𝑖 +  𝜀𝑐𝑖 
We reproduce the same exercise for each year between 1994 and 2004 (one regression per 
year), where our dependent variable as well as our measure of banking development are for a 
given year. 
Graph 1: Point estimates and confidence intervals of 𝜷𝟏for each year.  
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Table A reproduces the results presented in Table 3 in the main text but with clustered 
standard errors at the exporter level instead of exporter-industry level. 
. Table A: Export Patterns, Financial Architecture and Bank Dependence 
Bank Development measure BankDev1 BankDev2 BankDev1 BankDev2 
 I II III IV 
Bank Development 2.189** 2.043** 2.067** 1.780* 
   * Bank Finance Dependence (BFD) (0.899) (0.853) (0.889) (0.915) 
     
Bank Development   -0.354 -0.766 
   * External Finance Dependence (EFD)   (0.774) (0.745) 
  
# Observations 839 839 839 839 
R-squared 0.835 0.834 0.835 0.835 
The dependent variable is the log of exports to the rest of the world by each 3-digit ISIC sector for the year 2000. 
The Bank Finance Dependence variable is defined in section 2.1. All regressions include a constant term, year 
and exporter-sector fixed effects, and cluster errors at the exporter level. Standard-errors reported in parentheses. 
***, **, *, indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
 
Table B reproduces the results presented in Table 3 in the main text but with clustered 
standard errors at the industry level instead of exporter-industry level. 
. Table B: Export Patterns, Financial Architecture and Bank Dependence 
Bank Development measure BankDev1 BankDev2 BankDev1 BankDev2 
 I II III IV 
Bank Development 2.189*** 2.043*** 2.067*** 1.780*** 
   * Bank Finance Dependence (BFD) (0.663) (0.557) (0.687) (0.537) 
     
Bank Development   -0.354 -0.766 
   * External Finance Dependence (EFD)   (0.545) (0.556) 
  
# Observations 839 839 839 839 
R-squared 0.835 0.834 0.835 0.835 
The dependent variable is the log of exports to the rest of the world by each 3-digit ISIC sector for the year 2000. 
The Bank Finance Dependence variable is defined in section 2.1. All regressions include a constant term, year 
and exporter-sector fixed effects, and cluster errors at the industry level. Standard-errors reported in parentheses. 
***, **, *, indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
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Appendix 3 
Table C reproduces the results presented in Table 4 in the main text but with clustered 
standard errors at the exporter level instead of exporter-industry level. 
Table C: Financial Market Development and Comparative Advantage 
Equity liberalization date    Official     First sign    Official First sign 
 I II III IV 
Equity Liberalization 0.404** 0.374* 0.321 0.216 
 
(0.166) (0.206) (0.201) (0.235) 
     
Equity Liberalization -1.348*** -1.174** -1.256** -1.001* 
   * Bank Finance Dependence (BFD) (0.461) (0.522) (0.486) (0.528) 
     
Equity Liberalization    0.263 0.494 
   * External Finance Dependence (EFD)   (0.377) (0.466) 
     
ln GDP 0.300 0.323 0.302 0.327 
 (0.207) (0.204) (0.207) (0.204) 
  
Observations 18,078 18,078 18,078 18,078 
R-squared 0.803 0.803 0.803 0.803 
The dependent variable is the log of exports to the rest of the world by each 3-digit ISIC sector for the years 
1979-2004. The Bank Finance Dependence variable is defined in section 2.1. All regressions include a constant 
term, year and exporter and sector fixed effects, and cluster errors at the exporter level. Standard-errors reported 
in parentheses. ***, **, *, indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
Table D reproduces the results presented in Table 4 in the main text but with clustered 
standard errors at the industry level instead of exporter-industry level. 
Table D: Financial Market Development and Comparative Advantage 
Equity liberalization date    Official     First sign    Official First sign 
 I II III IV 
Equity Liberalization 0.404*** 0.374*** 0.321** 0.216 
 
(0.074) (0.083) (0.150) (0.149) 
     
Equity Liberalization -1.348*** -1.174*** -1.256*** -1.001** 
   * Bank Finance Dependence (BFD) (0.253) (0.328) (0.333) (0.394) 
     
Equity Liberalization    0.263 0.494 
   * External Finance Dependence (EFD)   (0.335) (0.367) 
     
ln GDP 0.300* 0.323* 0.302* 0.327* 
 (0.168) (0.172) (0.168) (0.171) 
  
Observations 18,078 18,078 18,078 18,078 
R-squared 0.803 0.803 0.803 0.803 
The dependent variable is the log of exports to the rest of the world by each 3-digit ISIC sector for the years 
1979-2004. The Bank Finance Dependence variable is defined in section 2.1. All regressions include a constant 
term, year and exporter and sector fixed effects, and cluster errors at the industry level. Standard-errors reported 
in parentheses. ***, **, *, indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
37 
 
Table E reproduces the results presented in Table 4 in the main text but using country-
industry fixed effects instead of country and industry fixed effects. 
Table E: Financial Market Development and Comparative Advantage 
Equity liberalization date    Official     First sign    Official First sign 
 I II III IV 
Equity Liberalization 0.295*** 0.294*** 0.130 0.109 
 
(0.067) (0.075) (0.095) (0.103) 
     
Equity Liberalization -0.812*** -0.760*** -0.631*** -0.558** 
   * Bank Finance Dependence (BFD) (0.225) (0.254) (0.240) (0.270) 
     
Equity Liberalization    0.520*** 0.577*** 
   * External Finance Dependence (EFD)   (0.177) (0.192) 
     
ln GDP 0.313* 0.336* 0.317* 0.340* 
 (0.187) (0.189) (0.186) (0.187) 
  
Observations 18,078 18,078 18,078 18,078 
R-squared 0.953 0.953 0.953 0.953 
The dependent variable is the log of exports to the rest of the world by each 3-digit ISIC sector for the years 
1979-2004. The Bank Finance Dependence variable is defined in section 2.1. All regressions include a constant 
term, year and exporter and sector fixed effects, and cluster errors at the exporter-industry level. Standard-errors 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, *, indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
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Appendix 4 
Table F presents the cross-sectional OLS regression between the requirement of bank finance 
for exports and the level of bank development of a country, without relying on the IV strategy. 
We estimate the following equation:  
𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑐   =  𝛼 0  +  𝛽1𝐵𝐹𝑁𝑋𝑐  +  𝛽1𝐸𝐹𝑁𝑋𝑐 +  𝛾𝑍𝑐 +  𝜀𝑐 
The left-hand side variable is the measure of country’s bank development defined in section 
2.2. The columns of Table F follow the same sequence as those of Table 5. The level of bank 
development of a country (𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑐) appears to be positively and significantly correlated 
with its export dependence on bank finance (BFNX). This is the case for both of our 
definition of bank development (columns I and II). It is also robust to the introduction of the 
EFNX variable (columns III and IV). 
Table F: Export Bank Dependence and Financial Architecture: OLS 
Bank Development measure BankDev1 BankDev2 BankDev1 BankDev2 
 I II III IV  
Bank Finance requirement for export  1.805** 1.971** 1.696** 1.911** 
 (BFNX) (0.751) (0.738) (0.796) (0.786) 
     
External Finance requirement for export   -0.176 -0.096 
(EFNX)   (0.374) (0.370) 
  
# Observations 30 30 30 30 
R-squared 0.171 0.203 0.178 0.205 
The dependent variable is a country’s banking sector development for the year 2000 defined in section 2.2. All 
regressions include a constant term. Standard-errors reported in parentheses. ***, **, *, indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
